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WEST VIRGINIA DIVORCE LAW"
CLYDE L. COLSON 0 0
II. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE
4. Cruelty. Although the West Virginia statute provides
that a divorce may be granted for "cruel or inhuman treatment,
or reasonable apprehension of bodily hurt",' -' it is construed as if
it provided simply that cruelty is ground for divorce."' Even if
the legislature had not stated that cruelty or "cruel or inhuman
treatment" should include any conduct which gives rise to "rea-
sonable apprehension of bodily hurt", the court itself would no
doubt have reached that result.' Here again it should be ob-
served that cruelty, which formerly was ground only for a divorce
from bed and board, was in 1935 made ground for an absolute di-
vorce.
In early times, to obtain a divorce for cruelty it was in general
necessary to show physical violence- actual danger to life or
limb. Although the English ecclesiastical courts did not wholly
exclude mental cruelty, they seldom found it sufficient unless ac-
companied by physical violence. Two factors have contributed to
the development of the modern view that mental cruelty alone is
enough. The more important factor was the establishment of a
scientific basis for mental cruelty- a realization that by reason
of the close interrelation of mind and body it is impossible to in-
flict serious mental suffering without threatening, if not actually
causing, equally serious physical injury. The second factor which
influenced the courts to discard the view that there could be no
divorce for cruelty without proof of physical violence was an in-
creasing liberality toward divorce in general. This liberalized
policy, however, probably had greater play in the determination
that particular misconduct did constitute mental cruelty. It is
thus seen that cruelty as ground for divorce is entirely relative and
accurately reflects the extent to which a court has recognized that
mental suffering affects bodily health and also the strictness or
Continued from the April, 1937, issue.
"*Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
159 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 35, § 4(d).
1 0 For other statutory expressions which are construed to mean 'cruelty",
see MADDEx, PERsoxs AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) 268.
101 "Cruel and inhuman treatment and apprehension of bodily injury ...
are so closely related that the same state of facts might establish either or
both." Lord v. Lord, 80 W. Va. 547, 551, 92 S. E. 749 (1917).
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liberality of its policy toward divorce. Today practically all courts
hold that mental cruelty is ground for divorce and some go so far
as to base a finding of cruelty on evidence which at best shows mere
incompatibility of temperament. 1
-2
West Virginia has always recognized that there may be cruelty
without physical violence. In Goff v. Goff, one of the first cases in
which a divorce was granted in this state on the ground of cruelty,
Judge Brannon after reviewing the evidence said:
"Observe there is no violence to the wife's person. Once
the law demanded this; but advancing civilization and right
reason have changed the law .... If the husband's treatment
be coarse, unnatural, abusive, so as to ... prey on the wife's
mind, produce mental anguish, impair her nerves and en-
danger her health, it is enough.' 16 3
In this its first comprehensive discussion of cruelty as ground for
divorce the court in substance adopted the test which it has since
consistently applied. Briefly stated, cruelty consists of personal
violence or any other course of conduct which actually causes or
which creates reasonable apprehension that it will cause bodily
harm or impairment of health.1 64
Although in a few comparatively recent cases the court has
defined cruelty as "personal violence or other acts tending to break
down the health and happiness of the offended spouse", 6" it is
extremely doubtful that the term "happiness" adds anything to
the test stated above. It will be observed that even when happiness
is mentioned the court requires that both health and happiness be
endangered. As will be seen shortly, there are so many cases in
which conduct well calculated to destroy happiness alone has been
held insufficient that a conclusion that the court has materially low-
ered its standard of cruelty is unwarranted. A statement of the
162 MADDEN, op. cit. snIpra n. 160, §§ 84-85; PECK, DOMESTIc RELATIONS (3d
ed. 1930) 164-165.
203 Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 16-17, 53 S. E. 769 (1906). And see Arnold
v. Arnold, 112 W. Va. 481, 484, 164 S. E. 850 (1932), where in comparing
mental cruelty to physical violence Judge Maxwell said: "Observation teaches
us that a lixed and constant attitude and course of conduct sapping and under-
mining the mental and physical organisms of a sensitive and refined woman
may be more cruel than intermittent blows."
104 Max-well v. Maxwell, 69 W. Va. 414, 71 S. E. 571 (1911) ; Huff v. Huff,
73 W. Va. 330, 80 S. E. 846 (1914); Lord v. Lord, 80 W. Va. 547, 551, 92
S. E. 749 (1917) ; Vickers v. Vickers, 89 W. Va. 236, 242, 109 S. E. 234 (1921);
Horkheimer v. Horkheimer, 106 W. Va. 634, 641, 146 S. E. 614 (1929).
10r Schutte v. Schutte, 90 W. Va. 787, 790, 111 S. E. 840 (1922). See also
Arnold v. Arnold, 112 W. Va. 481, 484, 164 S. E. 850 (1932); Smailes v. Smailes,
114 . Va. 374, 171 S. E. 885 (1933).
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true relation of happiness to cruelty and one less likely to be mis-
leading because it emphasizes the necessity of actual or threatened
bodily harm is found in Lord v. Lord:
"It is necessary to go beyond abuse and mistreatment,
however shameful, and find an injurious effect or result,
jeopardy or impairment of health by destruction of happiness
and peace of mind."' 66
Note, then, that the destruction of happiness as such is insufficient
and that it becomes ground for divorce only when it endangers the
health of the offended spouse.
In a detailed study of the cases, apparently inconsistent deci-
sions that particular conduct does or does not amount to cruelty
become understandable if one constantly bears in mind that cruelty
is "a relative term, and of necessity must depend upon the circum-
stances of each particular case.'I In the very nature of things
this must be true because sensibility to cruelty is variable. As it
was so clearly put by our court in an early case dealing with cruelty
as justification for desertion,
"Owing to the diversity of human character, and the
variety existing in the degrees of culture, refinement, and
sensibility of different parties, the causes which would be
regarded as insufferable cruelty by one might be utterly dis-
regarded by another.""'8
The supreme court of Pennsylvania expressed the same idea when
it said, "We do not divorce savages and barbarians because they
are such to each other.""'8 This being true, the test of cruelty is
not whether the conduct would be likely to cause either apprehen-
sion of bodily harm to, or physical or mental suffering endanger-
ing the health of, the ordinary person but whether it did have that
effect on this particular individual, taking into consideration his
physical qualities and his degree of refinement. Note, however, that
this is subject to a slight limitation designed to take care of the
supersensitive person. This limitation is found in the rule that
apprehension of bodily harm will constitute cruelty only if the
apprehension be reasonable. In other words, even though miscon-
duct of one spouse does in fact give rise to fear of injury on the
part of the other, the misconduct will not constitute cruelty unless
168 80 W. Va. 547, 551, 92 S. E. 749 (1917).
187 White v. White, 106 W. Va. 680, 686; 146 S. E. 720 (1929).
:Ls Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 704, 11 S. E. 12 (1890).
169 Richards v. Richards, 37 Pa. 225, 228 (1860).
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it would have caused such fear on the part of a reasonable person
of like sensibilities.
The most obvious cruelty is physical violence, and if suf-
ficiently serious, it is of course ground for divorce.17  But actual
violence will not amount to legal cruelty unless it causes or is likely
to cause personal injury or impairment of health. Hence slight
violence by the wife which does not in fact endanger the husband
is insufficient.' 7' The same rule would apply to slight violence by
the husband to the wife, but note that a different standard of
measurement would be used apparently on the theory that the wife
is physically less able to stand violence without ill effect."7  Here
again, however, no absolute rule can be laid down. The result
should depend on the the relative strength and physical condition
of husband and wife in the particular case.
Even though no violence is inflicted, a threat of violence which
gives rise to reasonable apprehension of bodily harm or which
causes worry endangering health is cruelty.' 73 As was said in Lord
v. Lord,
" When the words of threat are the expression of deter-
mined malignity, and there is reasonable ground to apprehend
that they will be carried into effect, they constitute a sufficient
ground for divorce."
74
In Lord v. Lord, however, it was held that because the wife's
threats to shoot or poison her husband were made only in the heat
of anger and were not believed by the husband who continued to
live with her without fear, they did not amount to cruelty.
75
There are several West Virginia cases dealing with the inter-
esting question whether it is cruelty for one spouse falsely to accuse
the other of crime or immorality. In Maxwell v. Maxwell, the first
170 Rice v. Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, 106 S. E. 237 (1921) ; Norman v. Norman, 88
W. Va. 640, 107 S. E. 407 (1921).
171 Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 80 S. E. 846 (1914).
172 This seems a fair inference from the fact that the court quoted this
language with approval; " 'It is not every slight violence committed against
the wife by the husband, even in anger, which will authorize a divorce. Much
less will slight acts of violence by a wife from which the husband can easily
protect himself constitute cruelty entitling him to a divorce.' 14 Cyc. 602."
Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 332, 80 S. E. 846 (1914) (italics supplied). For
another situation in which a wife's conduct toward the husband is measured
by a stricter standard than the same conduct by the husband against the wife,
see infra at 303, dealing with false accusations of infidelity.
' 7 Goff v. Goff, 60 W. Va. 9, 17, 53 S. E. 769 (1906) (repeated insults and
threats of violence).
174 80 W. Va. 547, 551, 92 S. E. 749 (1917).
17r And see Roush v. Roush, 90 W. Va. 491, 495, 111 S. E. 334 (1922).
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case dealing with this problem, in its discussion of an alleged accu-
sation by the husband that the wife had been guilty of criminal
abortion, the court said:
"If a husband accuse his wife falsely of such crimes such
accusations would be cause for divorce, provided, as in the
case of other false accusations of crime, they be made under
such circumstances, as to bring the wife into disrepute, .. .
and inflict upon her grievous mental suffering, impairing or
likely to impair her health or mind. .... The test is the mental
suffering of the wife ... .
Because no such suffering was shown it was held that the accusation
was not cruelty. With one statutory exception the court has con-
sistently followed the rule laid down in this case that a false accu-
sation of crime will not be cruelty unless it causes mental suffering
endangering health..
The statutory exception is found in the provision that a
"charge of prostitution made by the husband against, the wife
falsely shall be deemed cruel treatment ".1 7  Although a false
charge of prostitution may cause mental suffering, as in Boos v.
Boos,""5 it is not necessary to show this, proof of the accusation
alone being sufficient.1 7
A charge by the husband that the wife is guilty of adultery or
infidelity is viewed as less serious than a charge of prostitution
and will not ordinarily be considered cruelty.""0  Here again, how-
ever, no absolute rule is possible. The charge will be cruelty if it
causes or is likely to cause impairment of health, as in White v.
Wite'l8 where the husband's accusation was made while the wife
was still suffering the effects of childbirth. The rule that cruelty
is entirely relative and depends upon the sensibilities of the par-
ticular person affected is well illustrated by the application of a
176 69 W. Va. 414, 419, 71 S. E. 571 (1911). This case at 420 also holds that
false arrest is not cruelty unless the health of the accused is endangered.
177W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 35, § 4(d).
178 93 W. Va. 727, 734, 117 S. E. 616 (1923).
179 Dayton v. Dayton, 107 W. Va. 299, 148 S. E. 118 (1929). Bat query
whether the facts stated in the opinion show more than a false charge of
adultery.
1so Schutte v. Schutte, 90 W. Va. 787, 793, 111 S. E. 840 (1922) ; Criser v.
Criser, 109 W. Va. 696, 156 S. E. 84 (1930). That a false charge of adultery
may be cruelty, although the statute specifies only a charge of prostitution, see
Roush v. Roush, 90 W. Va. 491, 492, 111 S. E. 3"34 (1922).
1s 106 W. Va. 680. 684, 146 S. E. 720 (1929). But in Nicely v. Nicely, 81
W. Va. 269, 277, 94 S. E. 749 (1917), the wife was granted a divorce on this
ground, no mention being made of impairment of health.
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different standard of measurement in determining whether it is
cruelty for a wife falsely to accuse her husband of infidelity. Dis-
cussing this problem in Roush v. Roush, the court said:
"For obvious reasons a charge of adultery against the
wife ordinarily is much graver than the same charge against
the husband and if such charge is falsely made by the husband,
and especially so if it is malicious and unfounded, and tends to
cause the wife great mental distress and to undermine her
health, it is ground for divorce. But it should take much
stronger proof where the husband sues on this ground. Such
a charge would affect different men differently. A gay
Lothario would feel complimented; while a sensitive man of
high position, good character and reputation might be sub-
jected to great mental suffering, far beyond that which such a
charge would naturally have upon the average man. But in
the present case we do not think plaintiff has shown that he
has been so affected."1 1 2
It is generally held that if one of the parties in a suit for
divorce charges the other with adultery but fails to prove the
charge it is not cruelty unless the accusation was made in bad
faith. 33 In Schutte v. Sehutte although the court reached a result.
consistent with the general rule, it did so on the ground that a
charge of adultery is not ordinarily cruelty rather than on the
ground that such a charge made in good faith in an action for di-
vorce is privileged.8 4 In fact, the dictum that had the charge in-
volved an accusation of prostitution it would have been cruelty is
wholly inconsistent with the general rule and should not be fol-
lowed. To do so might discourage the bringing of an action for
divorce even though one reasonably believed that he had ground
for divorce. Schutte v. Sclutte also involved the analogous ques-
tion whether it was cruelty to institute a lunacy proceeding which
subsequently failed for want of proof. The court's holding that
the charge of insanity was not cruelty because the proceeding was
instituted in good faith'85 is obviously based on better reasoning
than its dictum in the same case that an unsubstantiated charge of
prostitution in a divorce proceeding is cruelty even though it was
made in good faith.
18290 W. Va. 491, 493, 111 S. E. 334 (1922). For another case in which the
wife's accusation was held not to be cruelty, see Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330,
80 S. E. 846 (1914).
182 Note (1927) 51 A. L. 1R. 1188.
2s4 Schutte v. Schutte, 90 W. Va. 787, 793, 111 S. E. 840 (1922).
185 Id. at 789.
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In order tj constitute cruelty it is not necessary that the con-
duct of one spouse be the direct cause of the other's mental suffer-
ing. It is enough that he indirectly cause it by exposing the other
to conditions which actually occasion the suffering. Thus, the hus-
band's arbitrary selection of a domicil where the wife is subjected
to the domination of his relatives18 or to actual violence at their
hands8 7 is cruelty if there is threatened bodily injury or impair-
ment of health.
There is much variety in the conduct which our court has held
not to be cruelty, either because in the particular case it entailed
no danger to health or because it was not considered serious enough
to be recognized as basis for mental cruelty though in fact it may
have caused mental suffering. The cases decided on the latter
ground merely reflect the court's policy against too great freedom
of divorce. In view of the trend toward greater liberality of di-
vorce as evidenced both by the legislative revision of our divorce
statute in 1935 and by some of the more recent decisions, it is not
unreasonable to anticipate that the court will in time recognize as
basis for mental cruelty conduct which heretofore has been con-
sidered not serious enough to be ground for divorce. In any event,
this possibility should be borne in mind in a consideration of these
cases.
It has already been seen that denial of sexual intercourse is
neither desertion nor justification for desertion, 88 and it is equally
well settled that such denial does not constitute cruelty.189 The
court's holding that degenerate and unnatural sexual conduct is
not ground for divorce, 80 which of course means that it is not
cruelty, seems wholly unsound. It is difficult to conceive conduct
better calculated to occasion mental distress to a normal person.
It has been held in several cases that mere expression of
hatred or disavowal of love is not cruelty.'"' It is also settled that
186 Horkhehner v. Horkheimer, 106 W. Va. 634, 146 S. E. 614 (1929).
187 Beuhring v. Beuhring, 111 W. Va. 135, 161 S. E. 25 (1931) (cruelty
justifying the wife in leaving so that the husband was guilty of constructive
desertion). For other cases of cruelty as basis for constructive desertion see
ante pp. 215-217.
188 Ante pp. 204-206, 214, which see for discussion of the problem whether
such refusal should be ground for divorce.
1sO1oush v. Roush, 90 W. Va. 491, 111 S. E. 334 (1922); Arnold v. Arnold,
112 W. Va. 481, 484, 164 S. E. 850 (1932).
1 0 Huff v. Huff, 73 W. Va. 330, 332, 80 S. B. 846 (1914).
191 Wills v. Wills, 74 W. Va. 709, 82 S. E. 1092 (1914) ; Schutte v. Schutte,
90 W. Va. 787, 111 S. E. 840 (1922); Smailes v. Smailes, 114 NV. Va. 374, 375,
171 S. E. 885 (1933).
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"mere incompatibility constitutes no ground for divorce' '. 2
Similarly, neglect or failure to support is not cruelty, though it
may be if it causes or threatens impairment of health.193
As will be seen later habitual drunkenness is one of the
separate grounds for divorce.' Although drunkenness which is
not habitual is not itself ground for divorce and hence is not
cruelty, it is no excuse for cruelty 95 and physical or mental suffer-
ing caused by the drunkenness will be ground for divorce. 9 '
The party seeking divorce must of course sustain the burden
of proving cruelty by a preponderance of the evidence. 197  When
the trial court has found on conflicting evidence that cruelty did or
did not exist, the appellate court ordinarily "will refuse to reverse,
although it might have rendered a different decree ..... in the first
instance.'" ' If, however, the finding is against a clear preponder-
ance of evidence, it will be set aside on appeal.'99
As will be recalled, our statute requires that divorce cases be
tried independently of the admissions of the parties in the plead-
ings or otherwise. 0 At first blush it would appear that this
statute was violated in two cases where much weight was given to
the fact that the defendant had admitted his guilt of cruelty by
executing a bond to keep the peace. In one of the cases the court
said:
"This writing is a clear admission upon his part that he
had been guilty prior thereto of breaches of the peace toward
the plaintiff, and is a solemn admission by him of the falsity
of the evidence he has given upon this hearing."10 '
192 Wills v. Wills, 74 W. Va. 709, 711, 82 S. E. 1092 (1914). And see Her-
beck v. Herbeck, 107 W. Va. 36, 146 S. E. 881 (1929)), where the court re-
versed a decree granting a divorce for cruelty on evidence which showed only
that the parties as the plaintiff alleged were "not temperamentally suited to
each other."
193 maxwell v. Maxwell, 69 W. Va. 414, 421, 71 S. E. 571 (1911).
'04 Infra at 306.
195 See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 69 W. Va. 414, 417, 71 S. E. 571 (1911).
196 Watson v. Watson, 112 W. Va. 77, 78, 163 S. E. 768 (1932).
197 Deusenberry v. Deusenberry, 82 W. Va. 135, 138, 95 S. E. 665 (1918).
IN Harwood v. Harwood, 112 W. Va. 344, 347, 164 S. E. 290 (1932).
'99 Rice v. Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, 106 S. E. 237 (1921) ; White v. White, 106 W.
Va. 680, 687, 146 S. E. 720 (1929).
200 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 11.
201 Rice v. Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, 57, 106 S. E. 237 (1921). Accord: White v.
White, 106 W. Va. 680, 686, 146 S. E. 720 (1929). Although it (lid not clearly
appear from the facts stated in Rice v. Rice that the writing executed by the
defendant was a formal bond to keep the peace, it was referred to as such in
White v. White where the court cited the Rice case as authority for the proposi-
tion than an admission of cruelty made in a bond to keep the peace is admissi-
ble in a divorce case.
8
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Despite this apparent disregard of the statute, in view of the fact
that the sole purpose of the legislature was to prevent the procure-
ment of divorces through collusion and of the further fact that
there is little danger of collusion through execution of a bond to
keep the peace, the soundness of the court's position is obvious.
In pleading it is not necessary to charge cruelty in the
language of the statute. As was said in one case, the bill is suf-
ficient if
"The facts alleged as constituting cruel and inhuman
treatment were charged with such reasonable certainty as to
enable defendant to meet them at the trial. This is all that
good pleading requires in any case, whether it be divorce or
otherwise." 202
5. Habitual drunkenness. Although habitual drunkenness
was formerly ground only for a divorce from bed and board, in
the 1935 revision it was provided that an absolute divorce may
be granted
"(e) For habitual drunkenness of either party subse-
quent to the marriage.... ,20 3
It is interesting to note that until quite recently the statutory
provision was that a divorce could be decreed "where either party
after marriage becomes a habitual drunkard. "204 Under this
former statute it was necessary to determine whether the guilty
spouse was to the knowledge of the other an habitual drunkard
before marriage. If so, apparently there was no ground for di-
vorce.2 3 If, however, the habitual use of intoxicants began after
the marriage, a divorce would be granted. " 8  The court has not
yet had occasion to construe the present statute, but it would seem
that drunkenness prior to marriage is now immaterial, it being
sufficient to show that it has since the marriage been habitual.
202 Deusenberry v. Deusenberry, 82 W. Va. 135, 136, 95 S. E. 665 (1918).
203W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 35, § 4(e).
204 . VA. CODE (Barnes, 1923) c. 64, § 6 (italics supplied).
203 Stuart, Adm'r v. Neely, Adm'r, 50 W. Va. 508, 512, 40 S. B. 411 (1901).
In this case the question was whether the wife was guilty of desertion and thus
had forfeited her dower rights. It was held that she was not because the
husband's habitual drunkenness, of which she had fio notice prior to the
marriage, v'as ground for divorce and hence was justification for her deser-
tion.
200 Mann v. Mann, 96 W. Va. 442, 123 S. E. 394 (1924).
9
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6. Drug addiction. No case -was found dealing with this last
ground for divorce. The language of the statute is again so clear
as to render comment unnecessary:
"A divorce ... may be decreed:
"(f) For the addiction of either party, subsequent to the
marriage, to the habitual use of opium, morphine, cocaine or
other like drug."20 7
III. DEFENSES
1. Delay in filing suit. It is clear that the general statute of
limitations has no application to divorce proceedings. As was said
in one West Virginia case,
"The remedy for divorce is in equity, not at ]awv... Di-
vorce being the subject of equity cognizance, in the absence of
any statute only principles of delay or laches in the bringing
of the suit could apply. 20 8
There is only one statutory reference to the time in which suit
for divorce must be brought. This is found in the provision that
no divorce may be granted on the ground of adultery committed
more than three years before the filing of the suit.2 9 It should be
noted, however, that this three year requirement is not strictly a
statute of limitations but is more in the nature of a condition pre-
cedent to divorce for adultery. This is illustrated by the recent
case in which a divorce was refused because it had "not been made
207 W. Va. Acts 1935, c. 35, § 4(f).
208 Kittle v. Kittle, 86 W. Va. 46, 50, 102 S. E. 799 (1920).
209 "No divorce for adultery shall be granted on the uncorroborated testi-
mony of a prostitute, or a particeps criminis, or when it appears that the
parties voluntarily cohabited after the knowledge of the adultery, or that
it occurred more than three years before the institution of the suit; nor shall a
divorce be granted for any cause when it appears that the suit has been brought
by collusion, or that the offense charged has lbeen condoned, or was committed
by the procurement or connivance of the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff has,
within three years before the institution of suit, been guilty of adultery not
condoned." W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 14. This section has
been quoted in full in order to show that it covers the four well recognized
defenses of collusion, condonation, connivance and r'ecrimination. Flormerly
the section applied only to suits for divorce on the ground of adultery but in
1931 it was amended so as to apply to all divorce actions. That the amend-
ment was intended to be only a declaration of existing law is apparent from
the Revisers' Note. This makes the statute of little value in determining
whether particular conduct is a bar to divorce. Consequently, it is necessary
to turn to the cases for the definition and development of these various
defenses.
10
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to appear affirmatively that the acts of adultery complained of
occurred within three years."
210
2. Unclean hands. In addition to recognizing the regular de-
fenses of collusion, condonation, connivance and recrimination
which will be considered later, our court has often applied the
equitable doctrine of unclean hands as a bar to divorce. In Hall
v. Hall, the first case in which this was done, the court said:
"To obtain relief in a court of equity, the plaintiff must
come with clean hands, and this maxim applies in divorce cases
as well as in others of equitable cognizance. This is the
principle underlying the defenses of connivance, collusion and
recrimination, everywhere recognized and permitted."211
As has already been seen this doctrine was used in Hall v. Hall and
in Hamilton v. Hamiton2 2 to relax the rule that no misconduct
short of ground for divorce would justify desertion..2 13 Note, how-
ever, that it is applicable to suits for divorce on any ground. 214 It
should also be observed that though the doctrine of unclean hands
is said to be the basis of three of the four regular defenses, it is
by no means limited to cases in which one of those defenses is
present. In fact it is ordinarily resorted to only in cases where
there is no other bar to relief.
In Edwards v. Edwards the court intimates by way of dictum
that a divorce may be refused even though the inequitable conduct
has no causal relation to the ground for divorce."', Recently, how-
ever, this was expressly repudiated in Hatfield v. Hatfield where
after reviewing the decisions the court said:
210 Brown v. Brown, 111 W. Va. 324, 326, 161 S. E. 555 (1931). This case
also illustrates the rule that a divorce for adultery will not be granted on the
uncorroborated testimony of the particeps criminis.
Query whether the one seeking a divorce must make it "appear affirma-
tively" that none of the defenses, which were mentioned in the statute quoted
in the last note, is present. In view of the fact that the statute was intended
only to be declaratory, it seems unlikely that the court would construe it so
as to impose this extraordinary duty on the plaintiff. That the problem is
raised, however, throws some doubt on the assertion of the Revisers that the
inclusion of the new matter in the statute, though it was already law, "can do
no harm, and may do good."
211 69 W. Va. 175, 179, 71 S. E. 103 (1911).
212 87 W. Va. 534, 105 S. E. 771 (1921).
213 Ante at 213.
214 Maxwell v. Maxwell, 69 W. Va. 414, 71 S. E. 571 (1911) (cruelty); Murnin
v. Murrin, 94 W. Va. 605, 119 S. E. 812 (1923) (cruelty); Edwards v. Edward J,
106 W. Va. 446, 145 S. E. 813 (1928) (adultery).
215 106 W. Va. 446, 457, 145 S. E. 813 (1928).
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"Thus, we find that in each of the cases in which peti-
tioner's relief has been barred by reason of 'inequitable con-
duct', there has been a causal relation between such conduct
and the offense charged . . .Of course, where respondent's
offense is in no manner connected with misconduct of the peti-
tioner, and that misconduct is insufficient on which to base a
ground for divorce, then petitioner's misconduct will not bar
his relief."'216
Upon a finding that the husband's misconduct had not "caused
or contributed" to his wife's adultery, he was granted a divorce.
3. Collusion. The gist of this defense is "agreement between
the parties whereby they seek to obtain a divorce by an imposition
on the court.12 17 In one of our first divorce cases it was said:
"It must not be lost sight of that the state must be re-
garded as a party to all such suits .... and it is the duty of
the court, as far as may be, to see to it that there is no col-
lusion; no suppression of evidence; in a word, no divorce by
agreement, or otherwise, in violation of the statute." 218
It has already been pointed out in another connection2 19 that in
order to guard against collusion the legislature has provided that
the bill shall not be taken for confessed, that the case shall be tried
independently of the admissions of the parties and that a di-
vorce shall not be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of the
parties ;220 and further that the court may in its discretion appoint
a divorce commissioner who shall "take all necessary steps to pre-
vent fraud and collusion in divorce cases." 22' Whenever it appears
that the parties have through concerted action attempted to impose
a fraud on the court or to obtain a divorce by agreement, the court
may of its own motion dismiss the bill for collusion.
222
4. Condonation. Forgiveness of past misconduct amounting
to a ground for divorce constitutes condonation and bars the right
to a divorce for the condoned offense. Obviously condonation "im-
216113 W. Va. 135, 144, 167 S. E. 89 (1932). -In this same case on a former
appeal, the court had reached the opposite conclusion. Hatfield v. Hatfield,
109 W. Va. 212, 216, 153 S. E. 493 (1930).
217 MADDEN, op. cit. stipra n. 160, § 89, which see for a more detailed treat-
ment than will be here attempted.
s Wass v. ass, 41 W. Va. 126, 130, 23 S. E. 537 (1895).
210 Ante at 125.
220W. V.k. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 11.
221 Id. § 24.
222See Bacon v. Bacon, 68 W. Va. 747, 749, 70 S.E. 762 (1911).
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plies knowledge of the offense committed' . 22  Since forgiveness of
known misconduct -will deprive the injured party of his right to
relief, he is under no duty to accept an offer of reconciliation and
thus condone the other's offense. 224  This should be distinguished
from the rule in desertion cases which requires the acceptance of
a bona fide offer of reconciliation made before the desertion period
is complete.22  The distinction is that in the desertion case there
is no right to a divorce whereas in a case involving condonation
the right has already accrued.
Condonation is conditioned upon the offender's subsequent
good behavior, and if this condition is broken, the condoned offense
is revived.226 Though in all the West Virginia cases so holding the
conduct condoned was cruelty which was revived by subsequent
unkindness, the principle of conditional condonation is not thus
limited. It is generally held that any condoned offense may be
revived by subsequent adultery, desertion or cruelty, and in the
latter case it is not necessary that the acts of cruelty be so serious
as to constitute ground for divorce.227  There is probably one ex-
ception in this state to the general rule of conditional condonation.
In view of the statutory provision that "no divorce for adultery
shall be granted - . . when it appears that the parties voluntarily
cohabited after the knowledge of the adultery,'22 it is doubtful
that there can be conditional condonation of adultery, the court
having said in a recent case that such cohabitation "is a conclusive
defense".2 2
Although condonation or forgiveness may be proved by an
express agreement,2 30 it is more often inferred from the conduct of
223 MADDEN, Op. cit. supra n. 160, at 305. And see W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931)
c. 48, art. 2, §14, where provision is made for condonation of adultery by
voluntary cohabitation "after the knowledge of the adultery". This neces-
sary element of knowledge should be read into the following language dealing
with condonation in general.
224 Rice v. Rice, 88 MI. Va. 54, 60, 106 S. E. 237 (1921).
225 Ante at 208.
228 Deusenberry v. Deusenberry, 82 W. Va. 135, 95 S. R. 665 (1918) ; Rieo v.
Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, 106 S. E. 237 (1921) ; Boos v. Boos, 93 V. Va. 727, 733,
117 S. E. 616 '1923); White v. White, 106 WV. Va. 680, 683, 146 S. E. 720
(1929).
227 MADDEN, Op. cit. supra n. 160, at 301-303, and authorities there cited.
228 . VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 14.
229 Deberry v. Deberry, 115 W. Va. 604, 606, 177 S. E. 440 (1934). If the
court should see fit, however, there would seem to be no reason why it should
not read into the statute the general rule that condonation is always con-
ditional.
23o Rice v. Rice, 88 W. Va. 54, 106 S. E. 237 (1921) (formal written agree-
ment followed by resumption of cohabitation).
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the aggrieved party. Thus, resumption or continuation of co-
habitation after knowledge of the offense is condonation.2"' It
should be noted that although the literal meaning of the word "co-
habit" is to live together, usually its legal meaning in divorce cases
is to have sexual intercourse, and for purposes of condonation it
is generally held that a single voluntary act of intercourse is suf-
ficient.23 2  The important element of condonation is the intent to
forgive which is easily inferred from voluntary intercourse, but
this intent is not so readily inferred from the mere fact that the
parties continue to live together. If the presumption of inter-
course which arises from this fact is rebutted, and if the living to-
gether is reasonably explained on some theory other than that there
was an intent to forgive, as by showing that the wife remained in
the home in order to care for her children, there is no condona-
tion.233  Further it was held in Norman v. Norman-34 that inter-
course itself is not necessarily condonation. In that case it was
clear that the wife, who was recuperating from a severe beating by
her husband, had no intent to forgive and submitted only because
she was physically too weak to resist.
5. Connivance. This defense consists of corrupt consent by
one spouse to an offense by the other and includes an element of
passive encouragement or active procurement.213  It has arisen
most often in cases of adultery. Although it is hard to draw the
line between passive conduct amounting to mere submission which
is all right and passive conduct encouraging the offense which will
bar the right to divorce, this statement by the Massachusetts court
is helpful:
"He [the husband] may properly watch his wife, whom
he suspects of adultery, in order to obtain proof of that fact.
He may do it with the hope and purpose of getting a divorce,
if he obtains sufficient evidence. He must not, however, make
opportunities for her, though he may leave her free to follow i
opportunities which she has herself made. He is not obliged
to throw obstacles in her way, but he must not smooth her path
to the adulterous bed." 23
231 Martin v. Martin, 33 W. Va. 695, 699, 11 S. E. 12 (1890); Nunn v.
Nunn, 101 W. Va. 636, 133 S. E. 363 (1926).
232 Deberry v. Deberry, 115 W. Va. 604, 177 S. E. 440 (1934).
233 Harwood v. Harwood, 112 W. Va. 344, 346, 164 S. E. 290 (1932).
234 88 W. Va. 640, 107 S. E. 407 (1921).
235 MADDEN, op. cit. supra n. 160, § 88.
238 Wilson v. Wilson, 154 Mass. 194, 195, 28 N. E. 167 (1891).
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In the only West Virginia case involving connivance of
adultery, the attempt to procure commission of the offense was un-
successful, but the court said that had it been successful, the right
to a divorce would have been barred.23 7 Despite occasional state-
ments by our court that one will not be permitted to take advan-
tage of an offense which he has caused or encouraged,2 38 there have
been no other cases dealing with the defense of connivance as such.
Relief has been denied on other grounds, as that a separation which
was encouraged is not desertion because consented to,213  or that
encouragement of an offense in such inequitable conduct as to call
for application of the clean hands doctrine.2 40  No doubt, should
a case arise in which one party had encouraged or procured the
other's addiction to drink or drugs, the court would refuse relief
under our statutory provision that no divorce shall be granted when
"the offense charged . . . was committed by the procurement or
connivance of the plaintiff." 24 '
6. Recrimination. According to the doctrine of recrimi-
nation, if both parties have a right to divorce, neither has. Thus,
in Morris v. Morris the husband was denied a divorce for the wife's
desertion because he had been guilty of adultery.2 42  Note that
corresponding to the rule that adultery is ground for divorce only
if committed within three years of the filing of the suit is the statu-
tory provision that it may not be used as a recriminatory defense
unless committed within three years.
24
Hatfield v. Hatfield,244 in which the defense of unclean hands
was limited to cases where there was a causal relation between the
inequitable conduct and the ground for divorce, contains by way
of dictum a full and instructive discussion of the doctrine of re-
crimination. It was stated that historically it is an off-shoot of the
general equitable defense of unclean hands. Tracing the doctrine
of recrimination from its beginning, the court pointed out that
recently a few states have shown a tendency to relax the original
237 Nicely v. Nicely, 81 W. Va. 269, 275, 94 S. E. 749 (1917).
P38 See, for example, Crouch v. Crouch, 78 W. Va. 708, 712, 90 S. E. 235
(1916).
239 Ante at 210.
240 Supra at 308.
241 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 14.
242 113 W. Va. 800, 169 S. B. 475 (1933).
2431 .... nor shall a divorce be granted . . . when it appears . . . that the
plaintiff has, within three years before the institution of suit, been guilty of
adultery not condoned." W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 48, art. 2, § 14.
244 113 W. Va. 135, 167 S. E. 89 (1932).
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strict rule. Having raised a query as to the desirability of this
tendency, Judge Lively, who before had been speaking for the
court, said that in view of the legislative recognition of the defense
of recrimination, his discussion would reflect only his own personal
view and was "not to be considered as a pronouncement of the
court. "2" He then proceeded to question the soundness of the
whole doctrine of recrimination. His language is so forceful and
so convincing that it is worth while to quote at length:
" .... we must not lose sight of the fact that the parties
in a divorce proceeding differ from those in the ordinary civil
suit or action. In the former cause, the state looks to the trial
chancellor as a protector of its interest in an orderly society,
in the welfare of the children which might be affected by a
divorce decree, as well as the welfare of every citizen; hence,
it would seem [that] a strict application of the clean hands
doctrine, without more, is merely a punishment of the litigants
and omits consideration of the interests of those [who are] in-
nocent but who are adversely affected by a decree which leaves
the parties in the situation where they have placed themselves.
Divorce is the climax of domestic discord; the affections which
united the parties in marriage have disappeared and hate and
disharmony have loomed in their places. To compel two per-
sons to live together under such circumstances would seem to
do violence to the moral sensibilities of an enlightened age ....
Is not the interest of society generally best subserved by a dis-
solution of the marital status and the possibility of future
respectability through re-marriage rather than a pretended
legal cohabitation attended by probable promiscuity to satisfy
the human passions? Courts which administer the divorce
laws should not close their eyes to the physiological and so-
ciological imperfections of mankind."24 6
As an a priori proposition, one would hardly suppose that ex-
tended argument would be necessary in support of a rule that
would allow a divorce when both husband and wife have been guilty
of conduct constituting ground for divorce. It is difficult for the
legal mind, and even more so for the lay mind, to appreciate the
rule that when there are two reasons for granting a divorce, no
245 Id. at 141. The specific reference was to the legislative recognition of
adultery as a recriminatory defense. It might be argued that by expressly pro-
viding for adultery as a defense by way of recrimination the legislature in-
tended to exclude all other grounds, but it is apparent from this statement
of the court that the doctrine is not so limited: "To constitute recrimination
• . . the conduct relied upon . . .must . . .constitute ground for divorce."
Id. at 142. This argument might be used, however, if the court should wish
to modify its strict rule.
2481 & at 141.
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reason at all exists. In any attempt to determine why the courts
ever adopted the paradoxical doctrine of recrimination, one is
forced to the conclusion "that this doctrine has been accepted with-
out adequate consideration' '.27 It is unfortunate that the rule is
so firmly imbedded that our court was unwilling to concur in
Judge Lively's reexamination of the reasons for and his criticism
of the doctrine. As he clearly demonstrated, a realistic and
sociological approach to the problem, which takes into consideration
not only the interests of the litigants themselves but also all other
interests involved, can lead to no other conclusion than that the
rule should be so changed as to meet the requirements of existent
social conditions.
Although worthy of consideration in the study of all problems
connected with divorce, this recent statement is of particular per-
tinency in a discussion of recrimination:
"Divorce is an effect, not a cause. It is a symptom, not
the disease. It is safe to assert, except in the most attenuated
institutional sense, that divorce never broke up a single mar-
riage. It is adultery, cruelty, desertion, drunkenness, incom-
patibility, the decay or transfer of affection, and the like that
destroys marriages .... It is only when every other marriage
tie has been severed, after the parties have discontinued their
marital relations, and have gone their separate ways, when the
marriage actually has no longer any existence in fact, that per-
sons resort to the divorce court in order that the remaining
artificial bond, created by the law, may be dissolved by the
law also. "24 8
Without following the implications of this language to the extent
of advocating the removal of all restrictions on divorce, one may
certainly go so far as to advocate removal of a restriction, which
like the doctrine of recrimination, finds its justification in precedent
rather than in its contribution toward the satisfactory ordering of
domestic relations under modern social conditions.
It should be noted that all that can be said against the doc-
trine of recrimination applies with equal, if not greater, force to
our court's recognition of the defense of unclean hands, by which
an otherwise valid right to divorce is barred by misconduct less
than ground for divorce.2 49 Although the limitation placed on the
247 Note (1926) 26 COL. L. Rsw. 83, 84.
248 ICHTENBERGER DIVORCE, A SOCIAL INTERPRETATION (1931) 16.
249 The West Virginia doctrine of unclean hands and the general doctrine of
recrimination were criticized in a recent Note (1931) 29 Miac. L. Rzv. 232.
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defense of unclean hands in Hatfield v. Hatfield was a step in the
right direction, in view of the legislature's recognition of recrimi-
nation as a defense and the consequent unwillingness of the court
to question the doctrine, there is little reason to expect a change in
our law unless by legislative action. It is to be hoped, then, that
the legislature will see fit to remove this restriction which now
prevents the court, even after all hope of reconciliation is doubly
gone, from decreeing legal dissolution of a marriage which in all
but form has been dissolved already.*
*A discussion of alimony, suit money, and custody of children as involved
in suits for divorce will appear in a later issue.
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